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1. Introduction
Education is thought to be central to economic development. Beneﬁcial in and of
itself, it is also viewed as a major contributor to human capital, leading to higher
productivity and living standards. Primary education is thought to be associated with
especially high returns.
1 Its importance is enshrined in the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), which call for universal primary education by 2015.
In fact, primary education is far from universal and this MDG remains elusive.
UNICEF (2008), the agency responsible for tracking progress on this MDG, estimates
an e tp r i m a r ys c h o o le n r o l l m e n tr a t ei nd e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r i e so f8 4p e rc e n t ;t h i si sa l s o
its estimated average for India. In view of this, governments across the developing
world have instituted a wide range of policies aimed at encouraging school enrollment.
School lunches are one such policy. They are thought to increase enrollment through
two main channels.
2 First, they lower the cost of schooling, thereby providing an
implicit subsidy to parents. Second, by improving child nutrition school lunches are
thought to foster learning, thereby increasing the returns to education. School feeding
programs are popular in the developing world and beyond. Despite a large empirical
literature on the relationship between feeding programs and educational attainment,
reviewed in Bundy et al. (2009), there have, to the best of our knowledge, been no
large-scale assessments of their causal impact on enrollment (Adelman et al. 2007,
p.2).
This paper ﬁlls this gap by providing a large-scale impact assessment of India’s free
school lunch program – known locally as the “midday meal” scheme – on primary school
enrollment. India’s midday meal scheme is the largest school nutrition program in the
world. In 2006, it provided lunch to 120 million children in government primary schools
every school day (Kingdon 2007). We exploit a quasi-natural experiment in order to
identify the causal impact of midday meals on primary school enrollment using a large
school-level panel data set, the District Information System for Education (DISE).
Our sample contains almost 500,000 primary schools in 15 major states across India,
observed annually in academic years 2002/3, 2003/4 and 2004/5 (referred to hereafter
as 2002, 2003 and 2004).
1Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) estimate private returns to primary education of over 25%, while
Duﬂo (2001) ﬁnds in a developing country context between 6.8 and 10.6 % returns to education from
primary school.
2These are widely documented. See, for example, PROBE (1999), Dr` eze and Goyal (2003) and Kremer
and Vermeersch (2004).3
Identiﬁcation of a causal eﬀect comes from state-level variation in the implementa-
tion of a 2001 Indian Supreme Court directive, which was instigated by public interest
litigation aimed at redressing starvation. The directive ordered states to institute mid-
day meals in government primary schools (referred to hereafter as public schools). Prior
to 2001, only two states had universal public primary school midday meal provision.
3
Over the subsequent three years, however, state governments across India introduced
midday meals.
Two main sources of variation are used in assessing the impact of midday meals: the
date on which states introduced midday meals in primary schools, and the fact that
(in accordance with the Supreme Court directive) they were introduced in public, but
not private primary schools. Since the directive was addressed nation-wide, concerns
regarding program placement bias are alleviated. Moreover, staggered implementation
at the state level in public but not private schools allows us to treat all private schools
as well as public schools in states not yet implementing the program, as a quasi-control
group for public schools in states which introduced midday meals.
We ﬁnd that midday meals lead to large and statistically signiﬁcant increases in
primary school enrollment. Our main triple diﬀerence intent to treat (ITT) estimates
point to a statistically signiﬁcant 13% increase in primary school enrollment, amounting
to around 14 additional students in each primary school. If newly enrolled children were
all of primary-school age (6-10 years), this would imply that midday meals increased
the net primary school enrollment rate from 84% (in 2002) to 95%.
The enrollment response to midday meals, although positive across all grades, is
driven by a large and statistically signiﬁcant response in grade 1. In grade 1, enrollment
increases by approximately 21%. The magnitude of the estimate reﬂects the fact that
grade 1 absorbs all new enrollments, which includes both under-aged children (typically
5-year-olds) as well as children over 6 years of age. In fact, since the net enrollment
rate in grade 1 is likely to have been close to 100% in 2002, older and younger children
are likely to account for most of the grade 1 enrollment increase.
In higher grades the response remains positive, with smaller point estimates and
statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients across all speciﬁcations. In part, this pattern
reﬂects the fact that whereas grade 1 picks up all new enrollments, upper grades only
pick up dropouts: a child can only enroll in grades G =2 ,3,4,5i fh eo rs h ew a s
enrolled in grade G − 1. Since dropout rates in grades 2-5 are low (see Table 3), there
is limited scope for midday meals to increase enrollment in the ﬁrst few years of the
programme exposure studied here.
3These two states were Tamil Nadu and Gujarat. A third state, Kerala, had an opt-in program.4
The decreasing marginal response to midday meals in higher grades is also, however,
likely to reﬂect the fact that the relative value of the implicit subsidy declines with
grade, since direct costs (such as textbooks or uniforms) as well as opportunity costs
(in terms of the value of household production or wage income) are larger in higher
grades, while the value of the subsidy remains constant.
These results are robust to a wide range of speciﬁcation tests. We demonstrate
that program timing is not associated with diﬀerent initial schooling input levels, or
trends in enrollment outcomes. We further provide robustness checks which indicate
that our results are not driven by the timing of implementation. Our main results are
virtually unchanged for a matched sample of public and private schools; and we provide
some evidence that enrollment in private schools did not respond to midday meal
introduction, suggesting that private schools are a legitimate control group. Neither
were there contemporaneous changes in relative inputs in public versus private schools,
and this alleviates concerns regarding confounding policy changes.
In addition to DISE, we exploit cross-sectional household and school survey data
from the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2005. Although our results are
only suggestive, given the cross-sectional nature of the data as well as its timing (af-
ter midday meals were introduced across India), these data nevertheless permit us to
extend our analysis in two ways. First, we explore whether the positive enrollment
response associated with midday meal provision is driven by more disadvantaged seg-
ments of the population, who are both least likely to be enrolled, and most likely to
be responsive to a food subsidy. The data conﬁrm that more disadvantaged socio-
economic groups display the largest enrollment responses.
Second, we examine whether midday meal provision is associated with improved
schooling outcomes on two additional dimensions, namely attendance, and learning
(as measured by separate test scores for reading, writing and mathematics among 8 to
11 year-olds.) We ﬁnd that midday meals are associated with improved attendance.
This makes sense given that school lunches are consumed on school premises at noon, so
children only beneﬁt from this subsidy to the extent that they actually attend school.
At the same time, midday meals are not associated with improved learning. This
indicates that the positive enrollment response we observe in our quasi-experimental
setting may be driven by the implicit subsidy channel rather than by nutrition-induced
improvements in learning.5
This paper contributes to a growing literature which relies on natural experiments
to assess the impact of schooling policies on schooling outcomes.4 Within the natural
experiments literature, this paper most closely follows Duﬂo (2001), who examines the
eﬀect of a large school building program in Indonesia on educational attainment and
wages, and Chin (2005) who assesses India’s Operation Blackboard (which introduced
additional teachers), in that the natural experiment here directly concerns variation in
the policy variable.
Our paper also complements a recent literature, which uses randomized trials to
evaluate the eﬀect of school feeding programs on school participation. Powell et al.
(1998), Jacoby E. and E. (1996) and (in pre-school) Kremer and Vermeersch (2004)
each ﬁnd increased participation resulting from breakfast provision in Jamaica, Peru
and Kenya, respectively. And Kazianga et al. (2009) ﬁnd that school lunches as well
as take home rations increase new enrollment for girls by 5 to 6 percentage points.
Identiﬁcation in our quasi-experimental setting is unlikely to be as clean as it is in
these carefully conducted randomized trials. Nevertheless, there are two strengths to
our approach. First, it enables an impact assessment of the world’s largest nutrition
program in a country which has the largest number of out-of-school children in the
world. Second, its large-scale nature allays concerns about generalizability, to which
smaller-scale studies are sometimes prey.
Finally, our ﬁndings generally corroborate the positive enrollment eﬀect documented
in smaller-scale non-experimental survey-based assessments of midday meal provision
in India. Our grade 1 enrollment eﬀect is similar to Dr` eze and Goyal (2003), who ﬁnd
an 18%, 11%, and 14% increase in grade 1 enrollment in their Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh
and Karnataka villages, respectively; but substantially smaller than the 36% increase
in grade 1 enrollment found by Jain and Shah (2005) in their 70 Madhya Pradesh
schools. The 13% primary school enrollment response we ﬁnd in our DISE data, is
also considerably smaller than the 23% increase in primary school enrollment found
by Khera (2002) in her 63 Rajasthan schools. Since previous small-scale studies have
measured the eﬀect of midday meal provision – which is likely to be an endogenous
outcome at the local level – often in relatively under-developed villages (such as Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan), our results suggest that the problem of purposive placement
may have resulted in an upward bias of previous estimates.5 An a i v ec o m p a r i s o no f
4See Kremer and Glewwe (2005) for a review of this literature and Hanushek (1995) for a critique of
earlier studies.
5In this sense, our results corroborate Afridi (2007), who exploits staggered implementation using a
double diﬀerence strategy in 41 Madhya Pradesh villages, and ﬁnds a similarly muted response in
enrollment and attendance.6
our estimate with these previous studies does suggest, however, that the magnitude of
the response we observe here is entirely plausible.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background regarding the Supreme
Court directive and the midday meal scheme, together with a discussion of its imple-
mentation and content. Section 3 describes the DISE data, and Section 4 presents our
empirical strategy. Our empirical results using DISE data, including speciﬁcation tests,
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents an extension regarding heterogeneous
responses, attendance, and learning associated with midday meal provision using IHDS
data, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Midday Meals
2.1. Background. In India, primary school education typically covers grades 1-5, and
is the joint responsibility of central and state governments. The central government
generally issues guidelines and provides funding, but policy implementation is a state-
level decision. The central government has a long-standing commitment to the provi-
sion of midday meals. As early as August, 1995, The National Program of Nutritional
Support to Primary Education mandated cooked meals in all public primary schools.
Not a single state responded to this universal mandate. (Kerala responded, but only
by oﬀering an opt-in program which resulted in partial coverage in public primary
schools.) Two states had, by this time, long established universal midday meal provi-
sion in public primary schools. Tamil Nadu, a state in the Southeast, was a pioneer.
Its state-wide midday meal program was launched in 1982 at the personal behest of its
then-Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran, who cited as his motivation early childhood
experiences with hunger (Harriss 1991, p.10). Gujarat, a state in Central-west India,
followed suit in 1984.6
Between 2002 and 2004, however, most Indian states instituted universal midday
meals in public primary schools. This wave was precipitated by a severe drought
that hit several states in 2001.7 Reports of drought-related starvation deaths in the
press instigated a public interest litigation. In April, 2001 the People’s Union for Civil
6Most other states provided “dry rations” to enrolled children who attended school, which typically
comprised 3 kg. per month of raw wheat or rice grains (depending on local consumption habits).
By many accounts, the distribution of these dry rations was sporadic, of low quality and conditional
attendance requirements went unenforced (see for example, PROBE (1999)). Moreover, there is
evidence of extensive leakage in this dry rations program, in the sense that children enrolled in private
schools also received dry rations (see, for example Muralidharan (2006)).
7There were 7 drought-aﬀected states in 2001: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Orissa, Madhya
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh (Down to Earth, Vol. 10, Issue 20010615, June 2001).
They include both early and late implementers of midday meals.7
Liberties (PUCL), Rajasthan, submitted a writ petition to the Supreme Court pointing
out that “while on the one hand the stocks of food grains in the country are more than
the capacity of storage facilities, on the other there are reports from various states
alleging starvation deaths.”8 The PUCL documented that, despite their protests to the
contrary, states could in fact aﬀord to widen a number of statutory food and nutrition
programs, including the midday meal scheme in schools. The writ urged the court to
instruct the Government to release public food stocks, arguing that the right to life
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution included the right to food.9 The petition
has culminated in protracted public interest litigation which is yet to be concluded.10
Nevertheless, on November 28, 2001 the Supreme Court issued an interim order
directing states to introduce cooked midday meals, i.e. a warm school lunch, in all
public schools, but not in private schools. More speciﬁcally, the directive said, “Every
child in every government and government-assisted school should be given a prepared
midday meal”.
2.2. Implementation. Implementation of this and other Supreme Court directives
are left to the relevant executive branch of government (Desai and Muralidhar 2000).
In this case, state governments were responsible for introducing midday meals.11 To ex-
amine the eﬀects of this policy change on schooling outcomes, we gathered information
on the policy implementation in public schools from state documents and then cross-
checked this information using at least two (and usually, more) independent sources
(see Appendix A for meal contents by state and list of state documents, independent
monitors, auditors, ﬁeld surveys and news articles).12
The result of this exercise is described in Table 1. Column 1 lists the 15 states which
are covered in the data for our school-level analysis, and Column 2 indicates the month
8Rajasthan PUCL Writ in Supreme Court on Famine Deaths, PUCL Bulletin, November 2001.
9Article 21 of the Constitution of India is entitled “Protection of life and personal liberty”. It states,
in its entirety, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.”
10PUCL vs Union of India and Others, Writ Petition [Civil] 196 of 2001. The Right To Food Campaign
has been closely monitoring the developments associated with this case and maintains an extremely
informative website at www.righttofoodindia.org.
11As Gauri (2009, p.2) notes, “courts do not and cannot enforce many of their broad directives”.
For this reason, estimating the intent-to-treat by using the Supreme Court directive as a source of
exogenous variation at the national level is not particularly meaningful.
12In the case of Andhra Pradesh, there was a discrepancy between independent sources and state
documents. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India claimed November 2003 implementation
and a best practice report of NUEPA put the date at 2001. We chose January 2003, as this was the
date provided by the state documents, 6 reports of the Commissioner of India and numerous press
reports. Dropping Andhra Pradesh from the sample or changing its implementation year to 2001 or
2004, has no qualitative bearing on our estimates.8
and year in which the corresponding state is documented to have introduced a midday
meal. Note that this does not necessarily mean that midday meals were in fact on
the ground in every public school in the state.13 Since, as we elaborate in Section 3,
enrollment ﬁgures are recorded as on September 30th of any given year, we regard a
state as having instituted a midday meal policy if its implementation took place before
September 30th in the corresponding academic year. The last column of the table
documents the year of initial treatment according to this criterion.
Data from three additional states – Jharkhand, Kerala and West Bengal – were
available from DISE but are not used in our main analysis due to poor documentation
of partial implementation, and potential purposive placement.14 Finally, also due to
worries of purposive placement, we dropped from our main sample 28 districts (in
2001 India had 593 districts) from Assam, Bihar, Karnataka and Orissa as well as all
tribal blocks from Madhya Pradesh in which the midday meal scheme was implemented
earlier. (We use the short hand “pilot” to refer to these tribal Madhya Pradesh regions
too.) Nevertheless, as we show in our speciﬁcation checks, the addition of these pilot
regions, as well as Jharkhand, Kerala and West Bengal does not change the results.
The wide geographic coverage of our data and state-level variation in the date of
implementation, evident in Table 1, are graphically displayed in Figure 1. Together,
the states covered in our data house over 80% of the Indian population according to
the 2001 Census of India. Pertinently, the geographic pattern in terms of timing of
implementation is mixed. For example, pioneers (Tamil Nadu and Gujarat) come from
South and Central India. Early implementers include not only the “usual suspects”
in Southern India, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, but also surprising candidates
13Data limitations make it diﬃcult to verify the proportion of public schools which actually provided
midday meals during our observation period. Household surveys are not conducted annually and
rarely pose a midday meal consumption question. Deaton and Dr` eze (2006) assert, moreover, that
at least in the National Sample Surveys (NSS), midday meal consumption is underreported. The
school survey data from IHDS 2005 (which we describe in Section 6) indicate, however, that in states
which we classify as having been treated by 2005, 84% of schools covered in the public school survey
are reported as providing midday meals. This suggests that the vast majority of schools which we
consider as treated in our ITT framework are, in fact, treated.
14Jharkhand instituted midday meals in November 2003 as a pilot project, but we are unable to
ascertain where these pilots were implemented. We could also not verify when full coverage was
announced as having been achieved. West Bengal started a midday meal roll out in January 2003.
We could not ﬁnd documentation for the placement, and full coverage is yet to be achieved. Kerala,
as mentioned earlier, allows schools to opt-in to the midday meal scheme, and this raises concerns of
selection bias.9
Note: ﾠThis ﾠmap ﾠdepicts ﾠthe ﾠgeographic ﾠcoverage ﾠof ﾠDISE ﾠ2002-ﾭ2004. ﾠ³0LVF.´ ﾠrefers ﾠto ﾠpilot ﾠ

























Figure 1. DISE Data Coverage and Midday Meal Implementation
like Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh. The so-called “BIMARU” states include late im-
plementers (BIhar), middle implementers (MAdhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) and
early implementers (Rajasthan).15
Idiosyncratic timing in implementation has been attributed to successful pressure
applied by civil society. In particular, the initial 6-month deadline set by the Supreme
Court was without exception breached, with states complaining that they did not have
suﬃcient funding to implement the policy. This excuse was widely dismissed by the
15The acronym comes from its resemblance to the Hindi word “bimar”, meaning sick. These 4 states
have among the lowest domestic products in the country. The fact that Bihar and Assam, two “late”
implementers in our sample, also have rather poor economic educational characteristics does not
obviously detract from our claim of idiosyncratic timing in light of the fact that Punjab and West
Bengal – two states which are not marked on this map but have reasonably advanced economic and
educational outcomes – also had not fully implemented midday meals by 2004.10
media, two Supreme Court commissioners, and the activist community, who instead
blamed the “lack of political, bureaucratic and societal will” for state governments’
recalcitrance (Parikh and Yasmeen (2004); Dr` eze and Goyal (2003) and Zaidi (2005)
make similar claims.) State government inaction spurred grassroots activists, coordi-
nated by India’s Right to Food Campaign which had grown out of the PUCL’s Supreme
Court litigation eﬀorts, to start public mobilization eﬀorts. It was these eﬀorts, sup-
ported by continued monitoring and chastisement on the part of two commissioners
as well as media, which compelled states to comply with the Supreme Court directive
(see Sharma et al. (2006) and Khera (2006)).
2.3. Financing and Content. The midday meal scheme is a joint undertaking of
central and state governments. During our observation period, the central government
provided ﬁnancial assistance to cover the cost of food grains and their transport. In
particular, The Food Corporation of India (FCI), an institution set up in 1964 to
support the operation of the central government’s food policies, provided states free
supply of food grains from the nearest of its warehouses. Provision for each student
with 100 grams of wheat or rice per day cost the central government approximately
Rs. 1.11 (NPNSPE 2004). In principle, fair average quality of the grains was also
guaranteed, with the FCI being responsible for replacing the grains otherwise. The
transport subsidy to carry the grains from the nearest FCI warehouse to the primary
school was set at a maximum of Rs. 50 per quintal, amounting to an average transport
subsidy of Rs. 0.05 per child per school day.16 The total value of the central government
subsidy between 2002-2004 therefore amounted to Rs. 1.16 per child per school day.
The Supreme Court’s 2001 directive mandated that midday meals have “a minimum
content of 300 calories and 8-12 grams of protein each day of school; for a minimum
of 200 days a year.” The overall responsibility for implementation of this directive lies
with state governments, who supplement the central government’s contributions to
varying degrees.17 Day-to-day operations lie in the hands of local government bodies,
16This ﬁgure is calculated from NPNSPE (2004, Section 3.4) which states that at the end of 2004, i.e.
after our period of observation, the transport subsidy grew by one third, namely to Rs. 75 per quintal,
which amounted to an average of Rs. 0.08 per child per school day. Following our observation period,
an additional Rs. 1 per child per school day was contributed by the central government towards
cooking costs, comprising cost of ingredients other than grains, including vegetables, cooking oil, and
condiments, as well as the cost of fuel and wages for personnel.
17These supplements are non-transparent and poorly documented, but available evidence suggests
that there is no obvious correlation between supplements and timing of midday meal implementation.
For example, Tamil Nadu (an early implementer) and Andhra Pradesh (which implemented in 2003)
both contributed Rs. 1 per child per day towards cooking costs in 2005, whereas Rajasthan and
Chattisgarh, which implemented earlier than Andra Pradesh, contributed little towards cooking costs
(Secretariat of the Right to Food Campaign 2005).11
typically village governments (panchayats), who sometimes delegate implementation
to local Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) or NGOs.
In practice, the meal itself tends to be a simple aﬀair. At around midday children sit
at their plates, which are typically set on the ground, where they are served a cooked
meal prepared on site, usually by a cook who is hired for this purpose. The meal
comprises cooked rice or wheat (depending on the local staple), mixed with lentils or
jaggery, and sometimes supplemented with oil, vegetables, fruits, nuts, eggs or dessert
at the local level (see Appendix A for details on meal content by state). Eye-witness
accounts (from present company included) note that, although the quality and variety
of the meal varies from district to district or even school to school, children seem to
enjoy their lunch (see, for example, Dr` eze and Goyal (2003)).
3. Data
In order to execute a large-scale evaluation of the midday meal program we use the
District Information System for Education (DISE), which is the “most comprehensive
information system in the education sector” in India (Ward 2007, p. 291). DISE is
as c h o o l - l e v e ld a t as e tc o v e r i n gg o v e r n m e n t - r e c o g n i z e de l e m e n t a r yi n s t i t u t i o n s .I ti sa
joint initiative of the Government of India, UNICEF and the National University of
Educational Planning and Administration (NUEPA), and came into being explicitly
because of a lack of reliable statistical databases for education in India (Mehta 2007).
Initiated on a pilot basis in 1995 to monitor schooling inputs and enrollment out-
comes for those districts covered by the District Primary School Education Programme
(DPEP), DISE was gradually rolled out to cover non-DPEP districts. Starting from
2002, DISE achieved coverage of all districts of the 18 states mentioned in Section 2,
where it was initially launched (DISE 2008).
Data is collected annually, and reﬂects primary school characteristics (such as in-
frastructure and staﬀ) as well as student enrollment as on September 30th of the
respective year.18 School headmasters answer a nationally standardized school survey
questionnaire. The data is veriﬁed and manually checked at various stages from lower
to higher levels of administration. At the cluster level, responses are veriﬁed for com-
pleteness and accuracy. The data is then aggregated at the district level, where it
is checked for computational and consistency errors. Further consistency checks take
18During our observation period, enrollment data was consistently collected only for grades 1 - 5, and
not for secondary or upper-secondary school. Although age-disaggregated enrollment, as well as non-
enrollment outcomes such as exam results, attendance, failure, drop-out and readmission questions
were posed in the DISE survey, these data are missing for the vast majority of schools, and are riddled
with measurement error and inconsistencies even when they exist.12
place at the state level. In addition to these measures, the NUEPA has commissioned
post-enumeration audits through external agencies, so as to verify the accuracy of the
data provided by the school headmasters. In these audits, 5% of schools chosen ran-
domly from at least 10% of districts from each state were thus cross-checked with site
visits (Kaushal 2009). The major ﬁndings of these surveys is that the total enroll-
ment ﬁgures for primary school are overwhelmingly accurate. Systematic errors were,
however, found in responses to questions which were either unclear, or open to subjec-
tive interpretation. Hence, we refrain from using variables which capture qualitative
assessments. For example, rather than construct a variable capturing the quality of
classroom infrastructure, we use the total number of classrooms in the school.
We exploit a three year balanced panel of 491,253 schools over the academic years
2002/03 to 2004/05.19 We consider public and private primary schools. Private schools
in Indian school system parlance are, in the context of our data, “unaided schools”.
What we call public schools in our sample are government owned and operated schools;
they are not so-called “government aided” schools. Government aided schools were
dropped since the documentation is opaque as to when and whether these schools were
covered by the midday meal program at the state level. They constituted 4.90% of
the full 2002-2004 data set, and including them in the analysis as either part of the
treatment or quasi-control groups does not alter the results.
Private schools constitute 6.53% of our sample. The distribution of public and
private schools among states in our sample can be seen in Table 2. The former closely
follows the state population distribution.
We estimate enrollment responses separately for grades 1 to 5, as well as for pri-
mary school as a whole. Table 3 furnishes 2002 means of enrollment and of schooling
inputs, which we use in our speciﬁcation tests. It indicates that average enrollment in
primary schools is just above 122 students, with a low average attrition of between 2-3
students per year between grades 2-5. On average, a primary school has about 3 class-
rooms, 1 additional room, 2 teachers, 0.4 non-teaching staﬀ (including para-teachers),
4 blackboards and 1.6 “trunks” of teaching materials. Just half of the schools have
ap l a y g r o u n d ,o n eﬁ f t hh a v ee l e c t r i c i t y ,8 0 %o fs c h o o l sh a v ew a t e r ,a n dt h em a j o r i t y
does not have toilets; 97% teach in the vernacular. In our estimations, we control for
19These are the only years for which data for all DISE districts were made available to us. Prior data
would, however, not have been representative at the state level, since survey coverage in previous
years was substantially more limited, and restricted overwhelmingly to educationally underdeveloped
districts within each state vis ` a vis education.13
these inputs and also create a matched sample based on these observable schooling
characteristics.
4. Empirical Strategy
4.1. Approach. To study the impact of the midday meal policy on primary school
enrollment, we exploit the variation created by its staggered introduction in public pri-
mary schools throughout India.20 We employ an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis through-
out (see for example, Imbens and Rubin (1997)). In particular, all public schools lo-
cated in a state which has been documented as having implemented the Supreme Court
directive at time t and thereafter (see Table 1) are considered as treated.
This approach has three related merits. First, it is a natural way to analyze a
policy which may be characterized by non-random compliance at the school or village
level. Second, it is useful from a policy perspective since state governments’ budgetary
allocations to midday meals are typically associated with their decision to introduce
the policy even if these allotments are not spent at the local level by non-compliers.
Finally, since DISE does not include information on midday meal implementation at
the school level, we are unable to verify compliance. (In Section 6, we exploit household
survey data containing information on schools’ midday meal compliance.)
Our aim is to identify the eﬀect of midday meals instituted in public schools (treat-
ment group) by certain states (experimental states). In order to accomplish this, we
need to control for systematic shocks in enrollment outcomes of the treatment group in
experimental states that are correlated with, but not due to, the institution of midday
meals. We accomplish this by estimating the following triple diﬀerence equation, which
uses private schools as an additional control group:21
(4.1) Yist = βMDMist+γt+λs+αPubi+δ1s(Pub i·λs)+δ2t(Pub i·γt)+δ3st(λs·γt)+￿i
20Broadly speaking, our use of staggered implementation as an identiﬁcation strategy follows Gruber
and Hungerman (2008), who assess the impact on religious participation of the repeal of “Blue Laws”
in U.S. states, and Field (2007) who studies a nation-wide titling program in Peru.
21Note that the approach used here is in fact an extension of the triple diﬀerence method, in that there
are more than just 3 treatment and control groups (public schools from 15 states and the respective
groups of private schools) and more than just 2 time periods. When extending the triple diﬀerence to
the case of multiple groups and time periods, the policy variable is no longer a triple interaction term,
but a policy dummy set to unity for groups and time periods when the policy was in place (see Imbens
& Wooldridge, Lecture Notes 10, NBER, 2007). Therefore, the result of the following estimation is
not equivalent to the diﬀerence in estimates from two separate double diﬀerences, as would be the
case for the standard triple diﬀerence. For simplicity, we will refer to our estimates as being triple
diﬀerence estimates.14
where Yist is the log of enrollment, for school i,i ns t a t es,a tt i m et =2 0 0 2 ,2003,2004.
In various speciﬁcations it pertains to enrollment in grades 1-5 separately, as well as
to total primary school enrollment.
The policy variable MDMist is equal to 1 if the midday meal program was in place
in public school i from state s prior to the September 30th enrollment deadline in
year t,a sd e s c r i b e di nT a b l e1 .T h ec o e ﬃ c i e n tβ is the triple diﬀerence estimate. It
captures changes in enrollment in public schools following the institution of a midday
meal program.
National trends in enrollment are captured through year ﬁxed eﬀects, γt.S t a t eﬁ x e d
eﬀects, λs,a c c o u n tf o re n r o l l m e n td i ﬀ e r e n c e sa c r o s ss t a t e s .T h ed u m m yv a r i a b l ePub i,
which is equal to 1 if school i is a public school and 0 if it is a private school, allows
for diﬀerent average enrollments in public relative to private schools. The interaction
term Pub i · λs permits this average to vary by state, and Pub i · γt captures a national
trend in public school enrollment.
The key advantage of this approach is that it allows us to account for state speciﬁc
shocks over the observation period through state-by-year eﬀects, λs·γt. This is impor-
tant in a federal country such as India, where schooling policy is largely governed by
states which have not only diﬀerent levels, but also diﬀerent trends in economic and
demographic development.22
There has been much discussion in the literature about the calculation of standard
errors for diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates, so this is worth commenting on upfront.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we cluster standard errors at the state level. How-
ever, as Cameron et al. (2008) point out, this may not resolve the problem of serial
correlation if the number of clusters is not large, as in our case with 15 states. To ac-
count for this we follow the recommendation of Cameron et al. (2008) and wild cluster
bootstrap the standard errors with 1000 replications (a cluster generalization of the
wild bootstrap for heteroscedastic models with equal weights and probability.) The
results are qualitatively identical. For simplicity, we therefore use the cluster-robust
standard errors in all estimations.
22A double diﬀerence strategy would not allow us to distinguish state-by-year eﬀects from the midday
meal eﬀect. Given state-time heterogeneity in India, where time-varying state level variables are
likely to vary between states pre and post treatment, this is likely to result in biased treatment eﬀect
estimates. Double diﬀerence estimates in these data (not reported) are never statistically signiﬁcant.
Inconsistent with extant statistical as well as anecdotal evidence, this is likely to be a reﬂection of
confounding state-by-year eﬀects. Moreover, the triple diﬀerence approach is a way of dealing with
worries of potential endogeneity of treatment, by including an additional control group that is also
aﬀected by the same time-varying state level variables.15
4.2. Identiﬁcation. The main identifying assumption in this triple diﬀerence speciﬁ-
cation is that there were no contemporaneous shocks in states at the time of midday
meal introduction, which impacted relative outcomes of the treatment group. At the
state level, such a change may occur in public schools if there is a contemporaneous
change in state school policy, and in Section 5.2.2 we provide a detailed discussion of
possible candidates. Additionally, private schools may have responded to the intro-
duction of a midday meal in public schools by strategically improving school quality
in the hope of attracting or retaining students. Such confounding changes are likely to
be reﬂected in relative changes in schooling inputs (including teachers, teaching aids
and physical infrastructure). We test this by putting these variables on the left hand
side of our triple diﬀerence equation (4.1). Our results indicate that there were no
contemporaneous changes in the relative inputs between treatment and control groups
at the time of midday meal introduction.
There are two pre-conditions for the validity of our quasi-experimental approach.
The ﬁrst is that control group outcomes are unaﬀected by treatment. In our speciﬁ-
cation tests, we try to verify this by showing that private school enrollment did not
change in response to the introduction of midday meals. The second pre-condition is
that there was no purposive placement of the midday meal policy.
As discussed in section 2, the timing of midday meal introduction was idiosyncratic.
This is supported by Figure 2, which depicts mean inputs (and their 95% conﬁdence
intervals) for schools, grouped by the year in which the midday meal was implemented.
(So, for example, the top left-hand graph indicates that schools located in states which
implemented midday meals in 2002 or earlier on average had about 4 classrooms.)
The fact that these conﬁdence intervals overlap indicates that diﬀerences in means,
by timing of implementation, are not statistically signiﬁcant. At the same time, 2005
implementers, Bihar and Assam, do seem to have consistently worse schooling quality.
We account for this in our speciﬁcation tests by showing that our results are robust to
the exclusion of late (as well as early) implementers.
There may also be lingering concern that the timing of midday meal adoption is
related to state policies or preferences which are correlated with state-level trends in
educational outcomes. Figure 3, which presents literacy data from India’s decennial
censuses, suggests that this is not the case. It shows that literacy rates, in states from
the sample grouped by timing of implementation over our period of observation, have
developed in a largely parallel fashion over the last twenty years.
Additionally, enrollment in public and private schools also developed in a parallel
manner two years before program implementation, for the states for which there is16
Note: ﾠThis ﾠfigure ﾠdepicts ﾠ2002 ﾠschooling ﾠinputs ﾠfrom ﾠDISE, ﾠgrouped ﾠby ﾠtiming ﾠof ﾠmidday ﾠmeal ﾠimplementation. ﾠThe ﾠ
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Figure 2. 2002 School Inputs by Timing of Midday Meal Implementation
suﬃcient pre-treatment data. Table 4 shows that for 2004 implementers there is no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the enrollment trend between 2002 -2003 for public
and private schools.23 However, there do exist observable diﬀerences in schooling in-
puts between public and private schools, as documented recently in Muralidharan and
23The results hold as well for the 2005 implementers (table not reported).17
Note: ﾠThis ﾠfigure ﾠdepicts ﾠtrends ﾠin ﾠliteracy ﾠrates ﾠin ﾠstates, ﾠwhich ﾠare ﾠgrouped ﾠaccording ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠtiming ﾠof ﾠmidday ﾠmeal ﾠ
implementation. ﾠThe ﾠgroups ﾠpertain ﾠto: ﾠGujarat, ﾠTamil ﾠNadu ﾠand ﾠRajasthan ﾠin ﾠ2002 ﾠor ﾠearlier;; ﾠAndhra ﾠPradesh, ﾠ
Karnataka, ﾠMadhya ﾠPradesh ﾠand ﾠMaharashtra ﾠin ﾠ2003;; ﾠand ﾠAssam ﾠand ﾠBihar ﾠin ﾠ2005. ﾠChhattisgarh ﾠand ﾠUttaranchal ﾠ
are ﾠnot ﾠseparately ﾠincluded ﾠsince ﾠthey ﾠbecame ﾠstates ﾠonly ﾠin ﾠ2000. ﾠSource: ﾠCensus ﾠof ﾠIndia. ﾠ
Figure 3. Literacy Rates by Timing of Midday Meal Implementation
Kremer (2006) and Kingdon (2007).24 As the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 indicate, pri-
vate schools have larger student bodies; have more rooms, staﬀ and equipment; better
24Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) and Kingdon (2007) have also noted a growth in private school
enrollment, driven primarily by the entry of private unrecognized schools. Since DISE only surveys
recognized schools and our sample constitutes a balanced panel, our results are not directly driven by
births in the sample. There may, however, be an indirect eﬀect if new entrants draw enrollment away
from extant public or private schools. To the extent that new private entrants (whether recognized
or unrecognized) draw proportionately from enrollment in extant public and private schools at the
state level over the period of observation, this should not compromise the identiﬁcation strategy in our
balanced panel. If, on the other hand, private unrecognized schools enter strategically where there has
been a failure in public schools, then our treatment eﬀect estimates may be biased downward. This
seems unlikely for two reasons. First, there is no reason to believe that private entry is correlated with
idiosyncratic midday meal introduction. Second, in a narrow, high-frequency window of observation,
parallel trends between private and public school enrollment within a state seems like a reasonable
assumption even with entry. Table 4 provides corroborative evidence in this regard.18
schooling infrastructure; and are less likely to teach in the vernacular (likely, reﬂecting
more English language instruction).
The main concern arising from these observed diﬀerences is that characteristics which
diﬀerentiate private and public schools may be associated with diﬀerent trends in en-
rollment between the two groups within a given state. We account for these concerns
by applying our triple diﬀerence estimation described in Equation (4.1) to a matched
sample of public and private schools. Remaining concerns pertaining to standard omit-
ted variable bias are accounted for by extending the empirical model to include a vector
of potentially time-varying school-level inputs Xit.
The goal of the matching exercise is to ﬁnd a group of private schools that is as
similar as possible to the public schools in our sample.25 To achieve this, we ﬁrst
estimate for each school the propensity score with a standard probit regression model
in which the independent variables are from the base year 2002. We match on basic
infrastructure (classrooms, other rooms, toilets, water, electricity, playgrounds), staﬀ
(teachers and other staﬀ), teaching learning materials (blackboards and trunks that
contain learning materials), language of instruction (vernacular) and on primary school
size. In the common support region, for each public school we ﬁnd a comparable private
school located in the same state with the closest propensity score. The propensity score
matching is done to the ﬁrst nearest neighbor without replacement so as to obtain a
sample of public schools as similar as possible to that of private schools. Unmatched
schools are discarded and not used in estimating the treatment impact.26
As the last two columns of Table 5 indicate, the matched sample of public and private
schools are indistinguishable in terms of observable characteristics. The residual dif-
ferences in average school characteristics after matching are close to zero and therefore
economically trivial.
5. Results
5.1. Main Results. We begin by estimating Equation (4.1) using pooled OLS. Table
6p r e s e n t so u rm a i nr e s u l t :t h et r i p l ed i ﬀ e r e n c ee s t i m a t eβ,w h i c hc a p t u r e st h ee ﬀ e c t
of midday meals (MDMist)o ns c h o o le n r o l l m e n t .E a c hc o l u m nr e p r e s e n t sad i ﬀ e r e n t
25A group of public and private schools that is similar on observable school characteristics will also
be more likely similar on unobservable characteristics such as the quality of schooling. Suggestive
evidence from the IHDS 2005 data set shows that, only once observable schooling characteristics are
accounted for, there is no statistical signiﬁcant diﬀerence in learning results between public and private
schools in areas where the midday meal program was not yet implemented.
26Matching with replacement does not eliminate the diﬀerences in observable average characteristics
between private and public schools. Our analysis was performed using the user-written Stata program
‘psmatch2’ (described in Leuven and Sianesi http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html).19
regression. In this and all other triple diﬀerence estimations, we control for state,
time, and public school dummies as well as their pair-wise interactions as presented in
Equation 4.1 (although, in the interest of space, coeﬃcient estimates are not reported).
In columns 1-5, the dependent variable is log of enrollment in grades 1-5, respectively,
and in column 6 the dependent variable is the log of total primary school enrollment.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), in this and all subsequent tables, standard errors
clustered at the state level are presented in parentheses.
The positive coeﬃcients for β in row 1 indicate that midday meals increase primary
school enrollment. The response is largest in grade 1 (column 1), where enrollment
increases by a large and statistically signiﬁcant 20.8%.27 The magnitude of this point
estimate reﬂects the fact that all new enrollments – 6-year-olds, older children, as well
as under-aged children – are mainstreamed in ﬁrst grade.
In grades 2, 3, 4 and 5 the point estimate for β falls and is statistically insigniﬁcant.
As mentioned earlier, this is likely to reﬂect two things. First, enrollment in grades
2-5 can only be increased by reducing dropouts and baseline dropout rates in grades
2-5 are low to begin with. Second, the relative value of the implicit midday subsidy
decreases with grades. Hence, midday meals are likely to be less eﬀective at spurring
(re)enrollment in upper grades.
Overall, midday meals engender a statistically signiﬁcant 13.3% increase in primary
school enrollment (column 6). The level results (not reported) underscore the economic
signiﬁcance of this percentage increase: it corresponds to around 14 additional students
per primary school, 6 of whom enter grade 1. (The fact that the level results closely
resemble the log results in table 6 suggests, moreover, that this main result is not
sensitive to functional form.)
This translates into almost 6.3 million (≈ 450,000 public schools × 14 additional
students) children entering school on account of midday meal introduction in our sam-
ple states. If 27 million primary school-aged children in the country were out of school
in 2002 (UNESCO 2006), and 20 million (≈ 80%) of these resided in the states we
study, this would mean that midday meals are responsible for absorbing a striking 30%
(≈ 6.3/20) of out-of-school children. Even if half of the 6 additional children entering
grade 1 were below 6 years of age, our estimates still suggest that midday meals would
still account for a 25% reduction in out of school 6 to 10 year-olds.
27This and other percentage increases in enrollment following from the binary explanatory variable,
MDM, are calculated in the following manner: 0.208 = exp(0.189) − 1.20
5.2. Speciﬁcation Tests & Extensions. In this section we run a number of spec-
iﬁcation checks to ascertain the robustness of our main results and validity of our
empirical strategy.
5.2.1. School-level Heterogeneity. Our research design allows for diﬀerent average en-
rollments at the state level between public and private schools. However, we may
still be concerned that secular diﬀerences in school characteristics are correlated with
diﬀerent trends in enrollment between public and private schools at the state level.
We account for this possibility in Table 7, which presents triple diﬀerence estimates
analogous to those in Table 6 using the matched sample of public and private schools
described earlier.
The results described in the top half of Table 7 closely resemble our main results.
The 13.1% increase in primary school enrollment presented in column 6 is strikingly
similar to the 13.3% increase estimated for the full sample. Also the point estimates at
the individual grade level (columns 1-5) are not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from
the estimates on the main sample. The magnitudes as well as the pattern of the point
estimates are qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 6. In particular, the
overall increase in primary school is driven by statistically signiﬁcant increases in grade
1 enrollment, and enrollment responses are positive throughout.
The bottom half of Table 7 extends this exercise to account for omitted variable bias
by including a vector of potentially time-varying schooling inputs Xit,s u m m a r i z e di n
Table 3. The coeﬃcient estimates on the schooling inputs (not reported) are consistent
with our priors: more classrooms, teachers, other staﬀ, blackboards, and physical in-
frastructure are associated with higher enrollment. The triple diﬀerence point estimates
in this speciﬁcation are very similar to those in the top half of the table, suggesting the
our simple triple diﬀerence estimates does not suﬀer from signiﬁcant omitted variable
bias. However this interpretation needs to be treated with caution since, to the extent
that schooling inputs are endogenous, all the coeﬃcients in this table will be biased. In
general, however, the magnitude of the point estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
and the overall pattern of the estimates is qualitatively identical to the triple diﬀerence
estimates in both the full and the matched sample.
Together these robustness checks alleviate concerns that heterogeneity across (private
and public) schools is driving our main results. Given the loss in sample size entailed
in this matching exercise, we conduct further speciﬁcation tests on the full sample,
although the results are qualitatively similar when using the matched sample.21
5.2.2. Confounding Changes. State governments have discretion over the implementa-
tion of school policies. This could be problematic for our triple diﬀerence model if there
were confounding policy changes at the state level contemporaneous to the institution
of midday meals, which aﬀected treatment and control groups diﬀerentially. In this
respect, the main public policy contender is the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA).
Targeted at the 6-14 age group, the SSA’s stated aims were to achieve universal en-
rollment and retention, bridge gender and caste gaps, and improve education quality.
It was launched by the Government of India in 2001-02, before our observation period.
To this extent, the observed eﬀect of the introduction of school lunches cannot be con-
founded with any eﬀect associated with cross state-time diﬀerences in the introduction
(or withdrawal) of the SSA per se. The SSA merged all previous investments in el-
ementary education, including the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP),
from the state or from the central government (SSA 2008).28
Under the SSA, new schools were opened in habitations with no schooling facilities
and the basic infrastructure of existing schools was strengthened. New teachers were
hired and grants were given for the development of teaching learning materials. The
interventions for out of school children focused mainly on alternative schooling models
(Alternative and Innovative Education (AIE) schools, residential bridge courses, tent
schools, mobile schooling or home based education) and on the building of Education
Guarantee Scheme (EGS) schools. These types of schools are not included in our panel
of schools. Therefore, as long as there is no diﬀerential impact of these interventions
on our treatment and control groups, they should not aﬀect our estimates.
Still, the concern remains that changes in schooling inputs introduced under the
auspices of the SSA may have coincided with midday meal implementation. We ex-
amine this possibility by estimating a triple diﬀerence with diﬀerent schooling inputs
(instead of enrollment) on the left hand side of Equation (4.1), focusing on the set
of schooling inputs that could have been changed under the SSA: basic infrastructure
of the schools (classrooms, other rooms, toilets, water, electricity, playgrounds), staﬀ
(teachers and other staﬀ) and teaching materials (blackboards and trunks that contain
learning materials).
28The DPEP was conceptualized in the early 1990s in response to India’s low literacy rates. Its stated
aims were to provide primary school access for all children, reduce dropout rates, increase learning
achievements, and reduce gender and caste gaps in educational attainment (DOE 1995). (See World
Bank (2003) for a review of the evidence regarding the impact of this program.) External funding for
the DPEP expired in 2001-02; only in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal did the DPEP continue to
be funded (in this case, by the UK Government) until 2003 (Krishna Kumar and Saxena 2001). In
the case of West Bengal, this does not pose a threat to identiﬁcation since West Bengal is not in our
main sample, and dropping Andhra Pradesh from our sample does not change the results.22
Table 8 furnishes the results of this exercise. Each column has, as a dependent
variable, a diﬀerent schooling input on the left hand side. With only one exception (a
common toilet, which is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level, and of the “wrong” sign),
the triple diﬀerence estimates for these inputs are statistically insigniﬁcant, indicating
that schooling inputs in public versus private schools within each state did not change
diﬀerentially at the same time of midday meal introduction. This is likely to be a
reﬂection of the fact that there was little change in public or private school inputs over
time during our three-year observation period, whether contemporaneous to midday
meal introduction or otherwise; this is immediately evident from a cursory glance at
descriptive statistics of schooling inputs by academic year (not shown). This feature
further alleviates worries regarding potentially confounding changes.
5.2.3. Contamination. In principal the increased enrollment in public schools can come
from two potential sources: children who would not have otherwise been in school (new
enrollments), or children who would otherwise be enrolled in private schools and may
be switching from private to public schools. In the latter case, our control group would
be contaminated and the triple diﬀerence estimates presented in Table 6 would be
upward bias estimates of the general equilibrium enrollment eﬀects of midday meals.
We explore this possibility by estimating the following double diﬀerence (DD) model
for our sample of private schools:
(5.1) Yist = λs + γt + φmst + ￿i,
where Yist, λs and γt are deﬁned as in Equation (4.1). The policy variable mst is equal
to 1 for all schools if the midday meal program was in place in public schools in state
s at time t.
The DD coeﬃcient, φ,i so n l ys u g g e s t i v eo fp o t e n t i a lc o n t a m i n a t i o n ,s i n c ew el a c k
ac o n t r o lg r o u pf o rp r i v a t es c h o o l s( i . e .t h i si sad o u b l e -a n dn o tat r i p l e - d i ﬀ e r e n c e . )
Nevertheless, if increased public school enrollment in grade 1 and primary school as a
whole reﬂected transfers, then we should expect to see a statistically signiﬁcant negative
coeﬃcient for our estimate of φ at these levels. Table 9 suggests that this is not the
case: coeﬃcients for grades and primary school as a whole are statistically insigniﬁcant.
This allays fears of contamination and provides some validation for the use of private
schools as a control group in the triple diﬀerence model.
5.2.4. Timing of Implementation. Our empirical strategy relies on the staggered timing
of implementation of the midday meal scheme. We argued earlier that the timing of23
implementation during our observation period is idiosyncratic. But there may still
be concern that early or late implementers have policies and preferences which are
correlated with trends in enrollment that are diﬀerent from others in our sample. One
way of addressing this concern is to examine whether our results are being driven by
these states.
In Table 10 we estimate the triple diﬀerence model in Equation (4.1) on four diﬀerent
samples of public and private schools, depending upon early or late implementation.
The point estimates are virtually identical when we drop laggards Assam and Bihar
(ﬁrst quarter of Table 10), pioneers Tamil Nadu and Gujarat (second quarter), or both
laggards and pioneers (third quarter). In addition, when we exclude one state at a
time from the sample our results are also unchanged (not reported), indicating that no
single state is driving our results.
Finally, as related in Section 2, we did not include pilot regions, Kerala, Jhark-
hand or West Bengal in our sample, because of both poor documentation regarding
implementation and worries of bias introduced by purposive placement. In the bottom
quarter of Table 10, we include schools in Kerala, Jharkhand, West Bengal as well as
schools covered in these pilot regions, treating each pilot region in a given state as a
“new” state, with the MDMist variable deﬁned accordingly. The bottom quarter of
Table 10 reports our triple diﬀerence estimates for this extended sample. The picture
remains the same (the p-value for the primary school coeﬃcient estimate is 0.104).
Together, these robustness checks indicate that our results are not driven by poten-
tially non-random timing of implementation.
6. Heterogeneous responses, Attendance and Learning
In this section, we use a recent household and school-level survey from the Indian
Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2005 in order to extend our main results in three
ways. First, one would expect that children from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds
comprise the bulk of the observed enrollment response, both because they are the most
likely to be out of school in the ﬁrst place, and because they are likely to be most
responsive to a food subsidy. We explore this by allowing for heterogeneous “responses”
to midday meal provision by caste, income and gender.
Second, proponents claim that on account of its on-site consumption after morning
lessons, one of the chief merits of midday meals is that it boosts school attendance,
which can be quite diﬀerent from enrollment, particularly in the Indian context. We
therefore explore whether midday meal provision is associated with higher attendance.24
Third, the positive enrollment response to midday meals documented in Section 5
reﬂects the sum of two eﬀects, alluded to in the introduction. The ﬁrst is the im-
plicit subsidy eﬀect, which is thought to be positive as school lunches lower the cost
of schooling. The second is the learning eﬀect whose sign is, in general, ambiguous see
(Kremer and Vermeersch (2004) and Kazianga et al. (2009) for detailed discussions.)
On the one hand, there is a positive direct eﬀect, as improved nutrition from midday
meal consumption leads to more learning, and commensurately higher returns to ed-
ucation, and thereby higher enrollment. But there is also a negative indirect learning
eﬀect. This arises from the possibility that limited resources in terms of personnel,
teaching tools, and infrastructure may have to be stretched over a larger number of
enrolled children; or from the prospect of teachers being distracted from teaching due
to meal-related administration. As a ﬁnal extension, therefore, we explore whether
there is any net learning eﬀect associated with midday meal provision.
Each of these outcomes are important policy issues in their own right, and therefore
worthy of investigation. It is worth emphasizing up front, however, that due to the
cross-sectional nature of the data as well as to the timing of the survey, we cannot rule
out endogeneity concerns, so the results presented here are only suggestive.
6.1. Data. IHDS 2005 is a nationally representative survey conducted in 41,554 house-
holds during 2004-2005 across all states and union territories of India with the exception
of the Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshadweep islands (see IHDS (2008) for complete
documentation). The survey covers 1,504 villages and 970 urban neighborhoods. In
addition to careful data collection and quality control (Desai et al. 2008), this survey
has 3 features which are useful for our purposes. First, income and demographic data
from the household survey allow us to examine heterogeneous programme responses.
The second unique feature of the household survey is that it includes not only stan-
dard enrollment data, but also information regarding each child’s school attendance,
as well as assessments of reading, writing and arithmetic skills for children aged 8-11
(developed in conjunction with Pratham, an NGO with extensive knowledge in this
area.)29
Third, in addition to the household survey, IHDS includes a primary school survey
which covered at least one public and (where present) one private school in each village
29The income and demographic questions are answered by the head of the household. Questions
pertaining to children in the household are answered typically by the mother. Tests were administered
in the household. Although all 8-11 year-olds in the sample households were supposed to take the test,
only about 72% of them actually did so, and we cannot rule out the possibility that missing scores
are non-random. Non-response is much higher for non-enrolled children, than for enrolled children.
However, non-response is not correlated with the degree of midday meal implementation.25
or urban block, the primary sampling units (PSU). Where there was no school facility
within the selected village, the nearest school was surveyed. Importantly, this school
survey included a question regarding whether a midday meal was oﬀered in the school.
We use this response to construct a dummy variable equal to one if at least one public
school in the PSU provided midday meals.30
Since tests were only administered to 8-11 year-olds, our core sample comprises
children in this age group who are either out of school or are currently enrolled in a
public primary school. Table 11 presents summary statistics for the 9,224 observations
in our sample. It indicates that 77% of children in this age group have access to a
midday meal oﬀered at a local public school. On average, 88% are currently enrolled
and, in the past week attended school for 30.9 hours. 34% belong to Other Backward
Castes (OBC), 36% are either Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes (SC\ST); 15%
belong to an upper caste; and the remainder (Other) belong to minority religions (86%
of this category are Muslim). The vast majority of children come from households
where parents have completed only 5 years of schooling or fewer.
Three dummy variables, Reading, Math and Writing,a r ec o n s t r u c t e dt oc a p t u r e
learning. Of the children who were administered learning tests, 72% can read at least
words; 40% of the children that took the math test can solve at least a simple addition
problem; and 61% can write a simple sentence with at most one mistake.
6.2. Empirical Model & Results. In contrast to our empirical strategy using DISE’s
panel data structure, we cannot use an ITT strategy exploiting staggered implemen-
tation of the policy. The simple reason for this is that by 2005 when the IHDS was
conducted, the vast majority of the Indian states had introduced the midday meal
scheme. Furthermore, because IHDS is a cross-section, and midday meals are only
oﬀered in public schools, we cannot use private schools as a control group since this
would not permit us to distinguish the midday meal eﬀect from secular diﬀerences in
enrollment between private and public schools.
We estimate the following baseline model:
(6.1) Rihj = λMDMj + νZih + ￿,
30The choice of school was non-random – where more than one of either facility was present, inter-
viewers were asked to select the facility which was predominantly used by residents. However, since
there is no variation in midday meal implementation across public schools within a given village, we
do not believe this introduces any bias in our estimation.26
where our unit of observation is child i,l i v i n gi nh o u s e h o l dh and PSU j.T h el e f t
hand side variable Rihj pertains, in various speciﬁcations to, (i) a dummy variable equal
to 1 if child i is enrolled in school (enrollment); (ii) the number of hours spent attending
school in the previous week (attendance); and (in three separate speciﬁcations) whether
(=1) or not (=0) the child can read, write or do math.
The dummy variable MDMj indicates whether, in PSU j where child i resides, mid-
day meals are served in public schools (MDMj =1 )o rn o t( MDMj =0 ) .T h ev e c t o r
Zih contains individual characteristics such as gender and age, and household char-
acteristics including caste and parents’ education. In order to capture heterogeneous
treatment eﬀect, we interact MDMj in three separate speciﬁcations with dummies for
caste/religious group, income quartile and gender. Eﬀectively, this means replacing
MDMj with the corresponding interaction terms.
Table 12 presents OLS estimates for equation 6.1. (Probit estimations produce
qualitatively identical results.) The sample in column 1 pertains to all children between
the ages of 8 and 11 who are either non-enrolled or currently enrolled in public primary
school. The point estimate in row 1 indicates that midday meals are associated with
10.8% higher enrollment in this age group. This estimate is similar to our DISE
estimates for primary school, but much larger relative to the responses in grades 3-
5 (where 8-11 year-olds are typically enrolled). While we cannot rule out bias, this
would be consistent with student retention in upper grades after 3-5 years of program
exposure (in 2005) following a large grade 1 response in the initial years of exposure.
The next three columns permit this average enrollment response to vary by caste and
religion (column 2), income quartile (column 3) and gender (column 4). Enrollment
increases across the board, but is largest for relatively disadvantaged children. With
respect to social group, column 2 indicates the response is highest for SC\STs and
the Other (predominantly Muslim) category; column 3 indicates that it is largest for
the bottom three-quarters of the income distribution; and column 4 indicates that it
is larger, although not signiﬁcantly so, for girls than for boys. Although this may be
indicative of purposive placement, it is nevertheless consistent with our priors that
disadvantaged children are likely to be most responsive to this food subsidy.
In column 5, the dependent variable is attendance and our sample is restricted
accordingly to children who are actually enrolled in school. The result suggests that
midday meal provision is associated with 2.6 additional hours of school attendance
a week, which corresponds to a one-third of a standard deviation increase. As with
enrollment, this may reﬂect purposive placement. However, it is consistent with the
fact that children have to attend at least morning classes to get lunch at noon. It27
is also supported by anecdotal evidence (PROBE 1999) that shows that with midday
meals in place children themselves like to come to school.
The dependent variables in Columns 6, 7 and 8 are dummies indicating a child’s
ability to read, solve math problems, and write, respectively. The coeﬃcients in row 1
indicate that midday meals are not associated with any learning eﬀect: the estimates
are statistically insigniﬁcant and close to zero in each of the three categories. This
weak correlation may reﬂect purposive placement if implementation occurs in more
disadvantaged regions. It is also likely to reﬂect a selection eﬀect, since the estimate
captures an average eﬀect of students from (as columns 2-4 seem to suggest) weaker
socio-economic backgrounds who are responding to the programme and stronger stu-
dents who are already enrolled.
Nevertheless, it is consistent with evidence from studies in other geographies, re-
viewed in Kazianga et al. (2009), that school feeding programs are often ineﬀectual at
raising academic achievement. It is also consistent with lower average schooling inputs,
resulting from a large enrollment response and an absence of any concomitant increase
in staﬀ or infrastructure. If midday meals are associated with higher enrollment but,
as these results suggest, no increase in learning, these data seem to suggest that the
implicit subsidy channel is driving the positive enrollment response to midday meals.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that India’s midday meal scheme has led to large in-
creases in primary school enrollment. Our main triple diﬀerence estimates indicate
that primary school enrollment increased by 13%. Back-of-the envelope calculations
(described in section 5.1) suggest that this corresponds to about 6.3 million additional
children in school, which is likely to amount to a substantial reduction in the esti-
mated 20 million 6-10 year-olds who were out of school in the states we study in 2002.
Household survey data also indicate that many of new enrollments may be children
from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, suggesting that the policy may be
successful in reaching segments of the population which have otherwise proved diﬃcult
to enroll.
The largest and most robust overall increases are in grade 1, where enrollment rose
by 21%. Enrollment responses in grades 2, 3, 4 and 5 are, by contrast, more muted.
The magnitude of the grade 1 eﬀect is consistent with the fact that never-enrolled
children are mainstreamed in grade 1, regardless of age. By contrast, enrollment in
later grades can only be boosted by lowering dropouts from the previous year, and
the scope for this is limited given the low dropout rate in higher grades. Eﬀectively,28
therefore, in order to boost enrollment in (for example) grade 5, a state would need to
have had midday meals in place for 5 years and retained the large grade 1 intake up
into grade 5.
The fact that we don’t observe this is partly a reﬂection of the fact that most states
in our sample were exposed to the programme for 1 to 2 years: hence, the response
in grade 1 and not thereafter. Even in the long-run, however, midday meals are likely
to be more eﬀective at encouraging school participation among children in the lowest
grades than the highest grades in primary school. This is because the cash value of the
meal is constant while costs of schooling increase with grade, due to the higher direct
costs associated with school materials (uniforms, books, etc.) and opportunity costs
(value of home and labor market production). This means that, in relative terms, the
implicit meal subsidy is higher in lower grades.
The main advantages of the data we exploit in our main analysis are its wide coverage,
timing, and panel data structure, which allow for a large-scale impact assessment of
this important school lunch policy. The disadvantage of the data is that it only has
reliable data on enrollment. Although this is an important and commonly utilized
metric for school attainment, it is arguably not as important as attendance or learning.
Starting in 2005 and continuing annually since then, ASER has initiated a rich large-
scale household and school survey. An interesting avenue of future research will be to
exploit exogenous variation in exposure to the midday meal program to identify its
eﬀects on attendance and learning.
Results from the household cross-section we exploit in this paper are only sugges-
tive of there being increased attendance but no signiﬁcant learning eﬀects associated
with the program. However, the former ﬁnding is intuitive given the administration
of lunches on site at midday. The latter ﬁnding does seem to be substantiated by
anecdotal evidence that the administration of midday meals distracts from teaching,
and that the enrollment response to the program has stretched limited resources, both
of which compromise learning. This is further corroborated by the fact that our DISE
data indicate little change in complementary staﬀ, materials and infrastructure. Given
the magnitude of the enrollment response engendered by midday meals, such invest-
ments seem necessary prerequisite if learning is to be promoted. Still, the absence of
any evidence of increasing learning coupled with large enrollment eﬀects suggests that
the implicit subsidy channel is responsible for the latter eﬀect.
Given the wide coverage of the data we exploit, we believe our main DISE enrollment
results to be representative for India. This is policy relevant given both the scale
of the midday meal program, and the fact that India houses the largest number of29
out-of-school children in the world (UNICEF 2008). It seems fair to speculate that
the magnitude of the response that we document here is larger than it would be,
were a similar school feeding program to be instituted in Latin America or East Asia,
where primary school enrollment is already considerably advanced. Quite apart from
enrollment eﬀects, however, there may be important nutritional or school attendance
beneﬁts which may still speak for the introduction of similar school feeding programs
in these regions. At the same time the enrollment eﬀects we document in this paper
may be generalizable to parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where primary school enrollment
rates are comparable to those of India, and decentralized government institutions have
the capacity to implement this logistically demanding policy.30
Table 1. Sample of states and time of implementation
State Name Implementation Treatment Year
Andhra Pradesh January 2003 2003
Assam∗ January 2005 2005
Bihar∗ January 2005 2005
Chhattisgarh April 2002 2002
Gujarat November 1984 1986
Haryana August 2004 2004
Himachal Pradesh September 2004 2004
Karnataka∗ July 2003 2003
Madhya Pradesh∗ July 2003 2003
Maharashtra January 2003 2003
Orissa∗ September 2004 2004
Rajasthan July 2002 2002
Tamil Nadu July 1982 1982
Uttar Pradesh September 2004 2004
Uttaranchal July 2003 2003
Note. a. The second column contains the month and year when the
midday meal scheme was implemented with full coverage throughout
the state; these dates were collected from state midday meal scheme
audit and budget reports. The third column contains the academic
year starting from which a state is considered to have implemented
the midday meal scheme; an academic year is considered to start on
the 30th of September. States marked with ∗ implemented the midday
meal scheme in pilot districts as follows: Assam Pilot in December 2004
(treatment year 2005), Bihar Pilot in September 2004 (treatment year
2004), Karnataka Pilot in June 2002 (treatment year 2002), Madhya
Pradesh Pilot in October 1995 (treatment year 1996) and Orissa Pilot
in June 2001 (treatment year 2001).
b. States or districts excluded from the main DISE sample due to par-
tial implementation, lack of information regarding where the scheme
was implemented or due to potential purposive placement: Jharkhand,
Kerala, West Bengal, Assam Pilot, Bihar Pilot, Karnataka Pilot, Mad-
hya Pradesh Pilot and Orissa Pilot. The main regressions in the paper
are similar if these districts and blocks are included (see text). All other
states are not covered by DISE.31
Table 2. School Distribution among States in Sample
Schools
State Name Population Public Private
Andhra Pradesh 9.24 7.67 1.98
Assam 3.23 5.55 0.09
Bihar 10.06 8.16 0.08
Chhattisgarh 2.53 5.07 3.07
Gujarat 6.14 2.11 1.46
Haryana 2.56 0.60 0.02
Himachal Pradesh 0.74 2.50 1.47
Karnataka 6.41 6.58 7.46
Madhya Pradesh 7.31 9.36 18.40
Maharashtra 11.74 7.53 3.59
Orissa 4.46 6.32 1.55
Rajasthan 6.85 10.30 16.56
Tamil Nadu 7.56 5.49 8.02
Uttar Pradesh 20.14 20.45 33.45
Uttaranchal 1.03 2.30 2.82
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note. In percentages. The second column ﬁgures are cal-
culated from Census of India 2001 data. The ﬁgures in the
third column are calculated from our main sample of public
schools. The ﬁgures in the fourth column are calculated from
our main sample of private schools.32

















Number of classrooms 3.27
(2.89)
Number of other rooms 0.96
(1.69)
Number of teachers 1.97
(1.93)
Number of other staﬀ 0.37
(1.06)
Dummy for water 0.80
(0.40)
Dummy for electricity 0.20
(0.40)
Dummy for girls’ toilet 0.23
(0.42)
Dummy for common toilet 0.35
(0.48)
Dummy for playground 0.51
(0.50)
Number of blackboards 4.41
(3.85)
Number of teaching trunks 1.62
(2.52)
Dummy for teaching in vernacular 0.97
(0.17)
Note. Standard deviation in parentheses. All regressions omit observations in 3
states and 29 pilot districts due to partial implementation, lack of information re-
garding where the scheme was implemented or due to potential purposive placement.
Data are from DISE 2002. Observations: a:4 8 9 , 1 2 5b:4 2 8 , 4 9 1 .33
Table 4. Double Diﬀerence: Parallel Trends between Public and Pri-
vate Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Primary
time x public -0.079 0.026 0.006 0.001 -0.000 -0.025
(0.049) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.036)
time 0.041∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
public 0.056 0.055 -0.010 -0.118 -0.264∗∗ 0.083
(0.151) (0.129) (0.105) (0.072) (0.058) (0.145)
Obs. 297,635 297,635 297,635 297,635 297,635 297,635
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. The dependent
variables are log of yearly primary school enrollment, total and disaggregated by grade.
The time dummy is set to unity for the year 2003. The public dummy is set to unity for
public schools. All regressions include only public and private primary schools from the
two years prior to midday meal implementation in the group of states that implemented
in 2004: Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa (excluding the pilot districts), Uttar Pradesh.
Data are from DISE 2002-2003.
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.0134




Public Private Public Private
School size 122.83 163.58 151.77 162.34
(112.47) (188.12) (170.55) (183.06)
Number of classrooms 3.02 6.98 5.81 6.92
(2.40) (5.69) (4.43) (5.45)
Number of other rooms 0.89 1.87 1.64 1.86
(1.60) (2.55) (2.37) (2.52)
Number of teachers 1.90 2.95 2.54 2.90
(1.73) (3.70) (2.91) (3.37)
Number of other staﬀ 0.34 0.75 0.54 0.74
(0.95) (2.07) (1.47) (2.00)
Dummy for water 0.79 0.96 0.96 0.96
(0.41) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Dummy for electricity 0.17 0.66 0.61 0.66
(0.37) (0.47) (0.49) (0.47)
Dummy for girls’ toilet 0.20 0.67 0.64 0.67
(0.40) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47)
Dummy for common toilet 0.33 0.73 0.71 0.73
(0.47) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44)
Dummy for playground 0.49 0.81 0.82 0.81
(0.50) (0.40) (0.38) (0.40)
Number of blackboards 4.20 7.57 6.47 7.52
(3.49) (6.64) (5.56) (6.47)
Number of teaching trunks 1.64 1.28 1.51 1.28
(2.49) (3.03) (1.97) (3.03)
Dummy for teaching in vernacular 0.98 0.83 0.94 0.84
(0.15) (0.37) (0.24) (0.37)
Note. Standard deviation in parentheses. Means are calculated on the
basis of 2002 values for a. full sample comprising 428,491 observations
and b matched sample comprising 53,954 observations. Propensity score
matching uses the nearest neighbor without replacement.35
Table 6. Triple Diﬀerence: Primary School Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Primary
MDM (β)0 . 1 8 9 ∗∗∗ 0.052 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.125∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.033) (0.071) (0.072) (0.067) (0.031)
Obs. 1,473,759 1,473,759 1,473,759 1,473,759 1,473,759 1,473,759
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.07
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All regressions
include state dummies, year dummies, a public school dummy PUB, and state x time,
state x PUB, time x PUB interaction terms. The dependent variables are log of yearly
primary school enrollment, total and disaggregated by grade. The MDM dummy is set to
unity for public schools once a state implements the midday meal scheme. Sample: All
regressions include public primary schools and private primary schools. All regressions omit
observations in 3 states and pilot regions from 5 states due to partial implementation, lack
of information regarding where the scheme was implemented or due to potential purposive
placement. Data are from DISE 2002 - 2004.
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.0136
Table 7. Primary School Enrollment on Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Primary
Triple Diﬀerencea
MDM (β)0 . 1 4 2 ∗∗ 0.081 0.059 0.044 0.057 0.123∗∗
(0.058) (0.050) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048)
Obs. 155,766 155,766 155,766 155,766 155,766 155,766
Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Triple Diﬀerence with Covariatesb
MDM (β)0 . 1 4 3 ∗∗ 0.078 0.054 0.036 0.047 0.125∗
(0.051) (0.057) (0.062) (0.063) (0.068) (0.060)
Schooling Inputs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 150,241 150,241 150,241 150,241 150,241 150,241
Adj. R2 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.25
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All regressions
include state dummies, year dummies, a public school dummy PUB, and state x time, state
x PUB, time x PUB interaction terms. Regressions b include as covariates the schooling
inputs listed in part b of Table 3. The dependent variables are log of yearly primary school
enrollment, total and disaggregated by grade. The MDM dummy is set to unity for public
schools once a state implements the midday meal scheme. From the sample in Table 6 a
sub-sample was created through a propensity score ﬁrst nearest neighbor match without
replacement on the common support, based on the 2002 values of the schooling inputs
described in Table 5, by state between public and private schools.
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.013
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Table 8. Triple Diﬀerence: Schooling Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Classrooms Otherrooms Teachers Staﬀ Water Electricity Gtoilet Ctoilet Playground Blackboard Trunk
MDM (β) -0.103 -0.056 -0.206 -0.046 -0.014 0.001 -0.023 -0.039∗ -0.015 0.205 0.037
(0.378) (0.197) (0.209) (0.143) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.379) (0.093)
Obs. 1,473,759 1,473,759 1,458,615 1,458,595 1,420,100 1,437,599 1,429,051 1,431,237 1,432,754 1,473,759 1,473,759
Adj. R2 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.03
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All regressions include state dummies, year dummies, a public school dummy
PUB, state x time, state x PUB, time x PUB interaction terms. The dependent variables are various schooling inputs as noted in the column title. The
MDM dummy is set to unity for public schools only once a state implements the midday meal scheme. Sample is as in Table 6.
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.0138
Table 9. Double Diﬀerence: Private School Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Primary
MDMstate (φ)- 0 . 0 5 3 - 0 . 0 4 9 - 0 . 0 3 4 - 0 . 0 4 5 - 0 . 0 6 8 ∗ -0.076
(0.056) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.034) (0.064)
Obs. 101,120 101,120 101,120 101,120 101,120 101,120
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All regressions
include state dummies and year dummies. The dependent variables are log of yearly primary
school enrollment, total and disaggregated by grade. The MDMstate dummy is set to unity
once a state implements the midday meal scheme in public schools. All regressions include
recognized private unaided primary schools only. All regressions omit observations in 3
states and pilot regions from 5 states due to partial implementation, lack of information
regarding where the scheme was implemented or due to potential purposive placement. Data
are from DISE 2002-2004.
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.0139
Table 10. Triple Diﬀerence: Primary School Enrollment, Various Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Primary
Without Late Implementersa
MDM (β)0 . 1 8 9 ∗∗∗ 0.052 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.125∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.033) (0.072) (0.072) (0.068) (0.032)
Obs. 1,312,917 1,312,917 1,312,917 1,312,917 1,312,917 1,312,917
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05
Without Early Implementersb
MDM (β)0 . 1 8 2 ∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.030 -0.030 -0.013 0.108∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.029) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.027)
Obs. 1,352,485 1,352,485 1,352,485 1,352,485 1,352,485 1,352,485
Adj. R2 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.07
Without Early or Late Implementersc
MDM (β)0 . 1 8 2 ∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.031 -0.030 -0.013 0.108∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.030) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.027)
Obs. 1,191,643 1,191,643 1,191,643 1,191,643 1,191,643 1,191,643
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05
With Pilots, Kerala, Jharkhand and West Bengald
MDM (β)0 . 1 4 9 ∗∗ 0.023 -0.004 -0.013 0.001 0.083
(0.064) (0.043) (0.070) (0.070) (0.065) (0.049)
Obs. 1,751,224 1,751,224 1,751,224 1,751,224 1,751,224 1,751,224
Adj. R2 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.21 0.09
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All regressions
include state dummies, year dummies, a public school dummy PUB, and state x time,
state x PUB, time x PUB interaction terms. The dependent variables are log of yearly
primary school enrollment, total and disaggregated by grade. The MDM dummy is set
to unity once a state implements the midday meal scheme. All regressions include public
primary schools and private unaided primary schools only. From the sample in Table 6 new
samples are created in the following way: In regressions a Assam and Bihar are excluded; In
regressions b Tamil Nadu and Gujarat are excluded; In regressions c Tamil Nadu, Gujarat,
Assam and Bihar are excluded; In regressions d the pilot districts Assam Pilot, Bihar Pilot,
Karnataka Pilot, Madhya Pradesh Pilot and Orissa Pilot are included as well as Kerala
(with implementation year 1995), Jharkhand (with implementation year 2004) and West
Bengal with (implementation year 2003).
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.0140



























Mother no education 0.64
(0.48)
Mother completed primary school 0.19
(0.39)
Mother completed more than 5 years of schooling 0.05
(0.22)
Father no education 0.36
(0.48)
Father completed primary school 0.30
(0.46)
Father completed more than 5 years of schooling 0.14
(0.35)
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Sample: children be-
tween 8 and 11 years of age, either out of school or enrolled in
public primary schools. 9,224 observations. Mean for attendance
is calculated on a 87% sub-sample of children enrolled in public
primary school. Means for reading, math and writing are calcu-
lated on a 78% sub-sample of children that took a learning test.41
Table 12. OLS: Enrollment, Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects, Atten-
dance and Learning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Enrollment Caste Income Gender Attendance Reading Math Writing
MDM (λ)0 . 1 0 8
∗∗∗ 2.592
∗∗∗ 0.004 0.015 0.006
(0.03) (0.69) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
MDM x Upper Castes 0.057
∗∗
(0.02)
MDM x OBC 0.076
∗∗
(0.04)
MDM x SC\ST 0.115
∗∗∗
(0.03)
MDM x Other 0.193
∗∗∗
(0.06)
MDM x Top Income 0.030
∗∗
(0.01)
MDM x Highmid Income 0.128
∗∗∗
(0.03)
MDM x Lowmid Income 0.123
∗∗∗
(0.02)
MDM x Low Income 0.106
∗∗
(0.05)
MDM x Female 0.123
∗∗∗
(0.04)
MDM x Male 0.093
∗∗∗
(0.02)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 9,224 9,224 9,224 9,224 7,984 6,644 6,631 6,594
Adj. R
2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.09
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is a dummy
equal to unity if a child is enrolled in school. Attendance refers to how many hours in school a child was present in the past
week. In Columns 6-7 the dependent variables are dummy variables equal to unity if a child can read, do simple math or
write. Controls included are gender, age, household size, caste dummies, income, dummies for mother and father’s education.
Sample: 8-11 year-olds that are either out of school or enrolled in a public primary school (Columns 1-4), sub-sample of
Column 1 sample of children that are enrolled in a public primary school (Column 5), sub-sample of Column 1 sample of
children that took the learning test (columns 6-8). ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.0142
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Appendix A. Midday Meal Implementation in Public Primary Schools
State Implementation Date Midday Meal Content
Andhra Pradesh January 2003 Rice, sambhar, egg/banana twice a week
Assam January 2005 Rice, dal, vegetables
Bihar September 2004(Pilot)
January 2005
Rice with sabji, dal, pulao, karhi or khichri
Chhattisgarh April 2002 Rice with dal or vegetables
Gujarat November 1984 Wheat, rice, pulses, oil, spices
Haryana August 2004 Mitha rice, vegetbale pulao, dalia, paushtic khichri or bakli by rotation
Himachal Pradesh September 2004 Grains, seasonal vegetables, fruit, eggs
Karnataka July 2002(Pilot)
June 2003
Rice, pulses, oil, salt, vegetables
Madhya Pradesh July 2003 Dal-roti/dal-sabji (in wheat predominant areas) or dal-rice/dal-rice-
sabji (in rice predominant areas)
Maharashtra January 2003 Rice, dal, vegetables, spices, oil, banana/egg at least once a week
Orissa June 2001(Pilot)
September 2004
Rice, dal, egg/soya twice a week
Rajasthan July 2002 Ghooghari (mixture of gur/jaggery and boiled wheat), dalia
Tamil Nadu July 1982 Rice, eggs, boiled potatoes, cooked black bengal, vegetables with vari-
ation
Uttar Pradesh September 2004 Food grains, pulses, oil, salt, spices46 References
Uttaranchal November 2002 - July 2003 Rice, dal, kheer, fruits and eggs alternately
The information provided in this table was drawn from state government documents listed in a,a n dt h e n
veriﬁed and cross-checked using more than one independent source listed in b-e). Sources of information are:
a. state government documents: The National Programme of Midday Meal in Schools, Annual Work Plan and
Budget, 2009-10’; b. planning commission: Program Evaluation Organization (2010): ‘Performance Evaluation
of Cooked Mid-Day Meal’, Planning Commission; independent monitors: the 6 reports of the Commissioner of
India on the Writ Petition 196 of 2001 (PUCL vs. Union of India and Others); c. independent auditors: Civil
Performance Audit Reports from 2007 and 2008 of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (for Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh,
Uttaranchal); National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, Study of best
practices in: Andhra Pradesh by Y.Josephine, Assam by VPRS. Raju, Haryana by M. Narula, Karnataka
by K. Srinivas, Maharashtra by S. Chugh, Orissa by S.K. Malik, Rajasthan by S. Kaushal, Uttar Pradesh
by K. Wizarat; d. ﬁeld surveys: Kumar P. and Sood T. (2005): ‘Bihar: Mid-day Meal Survey Report’.
Right to food campaign , Afridi F. (2005): ‘Mid-day Meals: A Comparison of the Financial and Institutional
Organization of the Program in Two States (Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka). Economic and Political
Weekly, Robinson F. (2007) ‘The Mid-Day Meal Scheme In Four Districts of Madhya Pradesh’. Jawaharlal
Nehru University The Hunger Project, CUTS Center for Consumer Action, Research & Training (CART) and
World Bank (2007): ‘An assessment of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme in Chittorgarh District (Rajasthan)’; e.
selected news articles and reports: Chettiparambil-Rajan A. (2007): ‘India: A desk review of the Midday Meal
Programme’ World Food Programme, Khera R. (2006): ‘Mid-Day Meals in Primary Schools: Achievements
and Challenges’ Economic and Political Weekly, Parikh K. and Yasmeen S. (2004): ‘Groundswell for mid-day
meal scheme’ India Together, Dreze J. and Goyal A. (2003): ‘The Future of Mid-day Meals’ Economic and
Political Weekly, R. Anuradha (2003): ‘Nutrition Schemes in Tamil Nadu’ UNDP, Khera R. (2002): ‘Mid-day
Meals in Rajasthan’ The Hindu.